Blog Archive

Friday, 26 July 2013

For Unit 4 explosion and melt through 1.2.3 Unit of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant: insider translation from Pattie L. Brassard

[snip] FB and translation

Updated Jun 21, 2011 10:00
May 12, 2011, TEPCO admitted (core melt) melt down from past February after the accident.
I was investigated melt down melt-through of Unit 1.
TEPCO, does not expose the data of 3/11 19:30 previously for water level and pressure of the reactor.
Further, it does not expose the data in the 3/20 22:00 previously also temperature data.
Therefore, no choice but to guess situation immediately after the accident.
, report of October [National Institute of JNES '22 (BWR) Heisei analysis of 2009 year earthquake level 2PSA] from data,
I tried to think of an accident of Unit 1 to choose the case closest to the accident of Unit 1 of this time.
It has been trying to adopt the [accident progress analysis of 2.1 BWR-3 Mark Ⅰ type reactor facility] Since the BWR-3 Mark Ⅰ is Unit 1,
I've given up there is an assumption that can not be inserted control rods.
Assumption at this time, the event of (C) subcritical ensure failure (AE) and water injection failure of large LOCA pressure vessel damage during the event (RVR),
Composite events (B) is obtained by superimposing all AC power loss can occur during an earthquake is high it is (ABCE).
The analysis result, the fuel falls, try reactor pressure vessel damaged in about 0.9 hours, it is overtemperature damage containment about 9.6 hours to about 0.7 hours.
It must be considered as a case of the earliest meltdown.
This time, I was paying attention to, it is progress [accident analysis 2.2 BWR-4 Mark Ⅰ reactor facilities (500 000 kWe class)].
In the event of loss of power (TBU), is the loss of power by an earthquake, failure to reactor water injection by high-pressure injection system (RCIC, etc.).
I have adopted this analysis emergency condenser because not functioning almost Unit 1.
The analysis result, the fuel falls, try reactor pressure vessel damaged in about 3.3 hours, it is overtemperature damage containment about 15.7 hours to about 2.4 hours.
In consideration of the size of the reactor, was shorter than the analysis of BWR-4 Mark Ⅰ type time flowing debris in this study.
Fuel fall, try reactor pressure vessel damaged in about 3.3 hours, to obtain a damaged containment about 13.8 hours to about 2.4 hours.
TEPCO reported the course of ① accident is shown in black. Deficit was estimated from nuclear accident simulation by (JNES) JNES.
3/11 14:46Magnitude 9.0 ", 2011 (2011) Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake" occurs, Unit 1 during operation, Unit 2, Unit 3 enters the control rods, fission was stopped.
3/11 14 :: 47Two emergency diesel generators started. No automatic start emergency core cooling system until the arrival of the tsunami.
(Emergency core cooling system _ emergency core cooling system., Instead of invoking even once)
3/11 14 :: 52Emergency condenser is started.
3/11 15:03Emergency condenser stop.
3/11 15:10I repeat until 15:30 the start and stop of the emergency condenser.
3/11 15:13Shows the reactor water level meter-300cm to (fuel range), scale down. I considered all the fuel rods exposed. Than accident record _20110516 in accordance with the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
3/11 15:16Is deprived seawater pump, the fuel tank by the tsunami of over 15m, emergency diesel generators stopped.
3/11 15:37Blackout (TBU). Is deprived seawater pump, the fuel tank, emergency diesel generator stops. (Emergency core cooling system) that is not working cooling function of reactor.
Do not open the safety valve relief. High-pressure injection system does not start.
3/11 18:01I reach to 2800 degree (pellet) itself begins to melt core temperature fuel. Loss of power (TBU) after 2.4hr.
3/11 18:55Bore the reactor pressure vessel. Loss of power (TBU) after 3.3hr. 
I did not cause water vapor explosion because there was no water in the bottom of the pressure vessel. 
Water level, pressure and temperature data of 3/11 19:30 previous reactor is unpublished.
3/12 05:25Bore the containment vessel. Loss of power (TBU) after 13.8hr later. Nitrogen and water vapor had been filled in the containment vessel, but I did not cause water vapor explosion because there was no water in the bottom of the containment vessel. In addition, debris did not flow into the suppression pool.
3/12 05:50Freshwater injection started.
3/12 10:16Vent the start of the containment vessel.
3/12 10:24Second vent of containment.
3/12 10:25Third vent of containment.
3/12 11:20re-criticality debris pressure vessel temperature rise and (remaining (molten lava uranium).
3/12 15:35Debris Most reach the sandstone layer of 200m under penetrate the mud rock of foundation ground and reinforced concrete shield. Steam explosion in the sandstone layer.
3/12 15:36Flammable hydrogen that leaked from the gap between the shield and containment,hydrogen explosion.
3/12 20:20Seawater injection started into the reactor.
__
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on-site monitoring data
It has risen to 3/11 20:20 67μSv/hr from 3/11 18:45 56μSv/hr. Be associated with a perforated pressure vessel is difficult.
It has skyrocketed to 3/12 05:00 1590μSv/hr from 3/12 04:00 69μSv / h. Coincides with the time of day with a hole in the containment vessel.
Move Fukushima 1.2 Unit in building between June 4 2011 to keep water level, such as through contaminated water pipe
It is speculated that the inflow and outflow from the drilled holes of debris groundwater from underground water vein of 15m below.
Contaminated water containment is conceivable that it flows into the hollow cavity of debris that could be underground 200m if Hiere.
Gennpatusikichinai_houshasennryou_0201164
The parodied China syndrome, I tried to think of Argentina Argentina ② syndrome syndrome than is happening.
It is a story that they can have a huge cavity in the basement 200m. I think the possibility is not zero.
3/12 3:37, and followed the movement of debris through the containment vessel to 3/12 05:25 at the latest at the earliest.
The debris, temperature is 2800 ℃ in what lava-like mixed iron, concrete uranium fuel has melted.
While repeating the re-criticality, we will open a hole in the ground.
Detailed view of a boiling water reactorThe thickness of the reinforced concrete shield wall shield wall is 10m total thickness of the foundation and foundation writing unit embedded concrete bottom of 2m, the containment vessel.
The melting point of the concrete is 2200 ℃, rebar 1450 ℃. Melt the foundation bolt and the vertical line thick, and flows in the mudstone layer of the ground.
PhotoPhoto
Estimated figure of debris drop of Argentina syndrome
Ground of the reactor building is a strong mudstone layer. The melting point of the mudstone is lower than 300 ℃ iron and 1150 ℃. Debris regained momentum and causing a small re-criticality to hit the underground water of 15m with the reactor building foundation,
I guess debris and made a large cavity in the basement cause re-criticality, the hydrogen and steam explosion is a big lump by groundwater large amounts of sandstone layer of 122m below.
Peaceful nuclear explosion ( Sedan nuclear test I'll give an example).
I have to record the explosion was equivalent to earthquake of magnitude 4.75.
TEPCO, Japan Meteorological Agency, want to publish the seismic data of the day.
See the summary of the ground reporting _P43 involved in the analysis of the seismic record
It is composed of a layer of five million years ago 25 million years ago to the third century Miocene from 1.7 million years ago, 5 million years ago to the third century Pliocene.
There is a thin layer of sandstone, sand as much as 15m below the foundation. Groundwater pump Sabudoren is prevented lifting of the reactor building to suck up the water in the sandstone layer.
Cs-134, Cs-137, I-131 has been detected from the ground water.
There is a sandstone layer was suppressed in mud rock up and down in the lower 122m ~ 229m of the reactor base.
Groundwater does contain a large number of in this sandstone layer.
This layer is in the offshore 40km of the nuclear power plant off Iwaki gas field (sandstone of the third century Oligocene-Miocene main gas layer (3 pieces), 2,000 ~ 2,100 m depth) is intended to lead to.
Might contain natural gas (methane) is large. Cause of the explosion of Unit 4 may this methane gas.
250m from deep wells in the primary campus west of 1200m from the reactor building, Cs-134, Cs-137, I-131 has been detected in 4/5.
20110601_1001
Videos of hydrogen explosion of Unit 1
Press release of TEPCO "_20110312 for white smoke generation in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 near"
There is a sentence ". White smoke occurred great shaking of the direct type occurs, there is a big noise in the vicinity of Unit 1" in this.
Strong shaking of the direct type language is a large explosion in the deep underground can be considered generation.
3m / s, debris has been received on the south side of the south wind at the time of the accident. I believed that there was a starting point of the explosion on the north side. Debris flows on the north side of the pedestal, you may have a hole in the containment vessel.
_2011327_3Photo_4
  Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 melt-through 
May 24, 2011, TEPCO admitted (core melt) melt down from past February after the accident. 
I was investigated melt down melt-through of Unit 3. 
TEPCO, does not expose the data of 3/11 19:30 previously for water level and pressure of the reactor. 
Further, it does not expose the data in the 3/19 06:30 previously also temperature data. 
Therefore, no choice but to guess situation immediately after the accident. 
, report of October [National Institute of JNES '22 (BWR) Heisei analysis of 2009 year earthquake level 2PSA] from data, 
I think the accident of Unit 3 to choose the case closest to the accident of Unit 3 of this time. 
Adopted the [accident progress analysis of 2.3 BWR-4 Mark Ⅰ type reactor facility] Since the BWR-4 Mark Ⅰ The Unit 3. 
Power loss assumption at this time is (TBU). 
The analysis result, the fuel falls, try reactor pressure vessel damaged in about 3.6 hours, it is overtemperature damage containment about 6.9 hours to about 1.7 hours.
TEPCO reported the course of ① accident is shown in black. Deficit was estimated from nuclear accident simulation by (JNES) JNES.
3/11 14:46Magnitude 9.0 ", 2011 (2011) Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake" occurs, Unit 1 during operation, Unit 2, Unit 3 enters the control rods, fission was stopped.
3/11 14 :: 47Two emergency diesel generators started. No automatic start emergency core cooling system until the arrival of the tsunami.
3/11 15:05The manual start the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system.
3/11 15:16Is deprived seawater pump, the fuel tank by the tsunami of over 15m, emergency diesel generators stopped.
3/11 15:25Cooling system is automatically stopped during isolating the nuclear reactor.
3/11 15:38Blackout (TBU). Is deprived seawater pump, the fuel tank, emergency diesel generator stops. (Emergency core cooling system) that is not working cooling function of reactor.
3/11 16:03The manual start the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system.
3/12 00:00Reactor water level gauge indicates 0cm, scale down. I considered all the fuel rods exposed.
Than accident record _20110516 in accordance with the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
3/12 11:36Cooling system is automatically stopped during isolating the nuclear reactor.
3/12 12:35High-pressure injection system by the pump of turbine drive with the steam by the decay heat of the reactor core started. Emergency battery needs.
3/13 02:42High-pressure injection system is stopped at the battery out.
3/13 04:24I reach to 2800 degree (pellet) itself begins to melt core temperature fuel. High-pressure injection system stops after 1.7hr.
3/13 06:18Bore the reactor pressure vessel. High-pressure injection system stops after 3.6hr. I did not cause water vapor explosion because there was no water in the bottom of the pressure vessel.
3/13 08:41Vent the start of the containment vessel.
3/13 09:36Bore the containment vessel. 6.9hr after high-pressure coolant injection system stops after. Nitrogen and water vapor had been filled in the containment vessel, but I did not cause water vapor explosion because there was no water in the bottom of the containment vessel. In addition, debris did not flow into the suppression pool.
3/13 09:25Fresh water injection start containing the boric acid from the digestive system to the line reactor.
3/13 13:12The start of injection of boric acid and seawater into the reactor from the digestive system line.
3/14 01:10Stop injecting seawater into the reactor from the digestive system line.
3/14 03:20Seawater injection Resume into the reactor from the digestive system line.
3/14 05:20Second vent of containment.
3/14 11:00Debris Most reach the sandstone layer of 200m under penetrate the mud rock of foundation ground and reinforced concrete shield. Steam explosion in the sandstone layer.
3/14 11:01Flammable hydrogen that leaked from the gap between the shield and containment, hydrogen explosion.
Fuel rods in the spent fuel pool causes a prompt criticality.
Fuel rods most of the fall on the sea within 5km of the primary east side.
It is estimated plutonium radiation is weak, heavy, toxic, strontium is falling on the sea, and has settled at the bottom of the sea.
3/15 06:14Explosion in Unit 4. Check are two holes in the wall 8m square. Then, the wall surface damage on the whole too soon.
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on-site monitoring data _3/13-3/14
It has risen to 3/13 06:10 5.9μSv/hr from 3/13 05:40 4.5μSv/hr. Be associated with a perforated pressure vessel is difficult.
It has skyrocketed to 3/13 09:20 281.7μSv/hr from 3/13 08:20 3.166μSv / h. Coincides with the time of day with a hole in the containment vessel.
I also considered the impact of the start of the vent 3/13 08:41 Unit 3.
However, this time the wind is southwest, water vapor in the vent does not come flowing in the measurement point of monitoring post near the west side of the nuclear power plant.
It is reasonable to assume that to be due to an accident with a hole in the containment vessel.
Schematic diagram of Argentina syndrome of Unit 3
I think Argentina syndrome is the same as the No. 1, but the debris fell into the underground cavity Unit 1 opened. I guess a large amount of methane gas is released from the sandstone by this debris, and caused the explosion of Unit 4. I will be considered into the containment vessel from inspection lid of inspection cleaning work for Unit 4 pressure control chamber pool from Units 3 and 4 underground passageway, methane gas and flows in the operation floor.
Gennpatusikichinai_houshasennryou_0Photo_2
_ Estimated TEPCO announcement of Unit 4 hydrogen explosion mechanism
Those who consider valves 9 does not need to be commonly used and was closed is appropriate.
Investigation by the parties is unfair. Fire investigation Fire Research Center by the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency instruction is required. It is also conceivable that the methane gas collected in the storage vessel out of the lid has reached explosive limit (5%), and exploded in the containment vessel primarily. Seems to have repeatedly explosion. It would have destroyed the wall, a pillar sheet plugs blown away.
Roll has a large earthquake, because it was long, should the seat plugs removed in periodic inspection, I was on the floor was repeatedly collided with the wall violently. Damage on the fifth floor in the explosion other than, I also considered the collision.11-03-27 10:11:18 Ministry of Defense video channelI can see the one that seems to plug sheet.
Photo_3__
  Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 melt through 
May 24, 2011, TEPCO admitted (meltdown) meltdown of Unit 2 and from past February after the accident. 
I was investigated melt down melt-through of Unit 2. 
TEPCO, does not expose the data of 3/11 20:00 previously for water level and pressure of the reactor. 
Further, it does not expose the data in the 3/20 22:00 previously also temperature data. 
Therefore, no choice but to guess situation immediately after the accident. 
, report of October [National Institute of JNES '22 (BWR) Heisei analysis of 2009 year earthquake level 2PSA] from data, 
I tried to think about the accident of Unit 2 to choose the case closest to the accident of Unit 2 of this time. 
Adopted the [accident progress analysis of 2.3 BWR-4 Mark Ⅰ type reactor facility] Since the BWR-4 Mark Ⅰ Unit 2. 
It is the same as the Unit 3. 
Power loss assumption at this time is (TBU). 
The analysis result, the fuel falls, try reactor pressure vessel damaged in about 3.6 hours, it is overtemperature damage containment about 6.9 hours to about 1.7 hours.
TEPCO reported the course of ① accident is shown in black. Deficit was estimated from nuclear accident simulation by (JNES) JNES.
3/11 14:46Magnitude 9.0 ", 2011 (2011) Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake" occurs, Unit 1 during operation, Unit 2, Unit 3 enters the control rods, fission was stopped.
3/11 14:47Two emergency diesel generators started.
3/11 14:52Emergency core cooling system does not auto-start.
Order did not lead to automatic startup level.
3/11 14:50Reactor core isolation cooling during manual start system (battery power) (first time).
3/11 14:51Reactor core isolation cooling when automatic stop system (battery power) (first time).
3/11 15:00Launch the residual heat removal system pump.
3/11 15:02Reactor core isolation cooling during manual start system (battery power) (second time).
3/11 15:16Is deprived seawater pump, the fuel tank by the tsunami of over 15m, emergency diesel generators stopped.
3/11 15:16Residual heat removal system pump stopped by loss of power.
Residual heat removal system pump was operated only 16 minutes.
3/11 15:28Reactor core isolation cooling when automatic stop system (battery power) (second time).
3/11 15:30It is not possible to manually start (emergency core cooling system) cooling function of reactor.
Operating time of the emergency core cooling system is zero.
3/11 15:31High-pressure injection system is inoperative in the battery submerged.
3/11 15:39Reactor core isolation cooling during manual start system (battery power) (third time).
3/11 15:41Blackout (TBU). Is deprived seawater pump, the fuel tank, emergency diesel generator stops. (Emergency core cooling system) that is not working cooling function of reactor.
3/11 15:39The manual start-up cooling system (battery power) reactor core isolation time.
3/11 16:36It is not possible to manually start (emergency core cooling system) cooling function of reactor.
3/11 16:03The manual start-up cooling system (battery power) reactor core isolation time.
3/12 00:00Reactor water level gauge indicates 0cm, scale down. I considered all the fuel rods exposed.
_20110516 Accident record in accordance with the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant from
3/13 11:00Vent the start of the containment vessel (first time).
3/14 11:01Building nuclear power panel open
3/14 13:25Reactor core isolation time by the low battery stop cooling system (third estimate).
48 minutes total operating time 1m +26 m +68 h21m = 69 time of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system.
3/14 15:07I reach to 2800 degree (pellet) itself begins to melt core temperature fuel. Cooling system stops after 1.7hr reactor core isolation time.
3/14 17:01Bore the reactor pressure vessel. Stop after stop after 3.6hr the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system.
I did not cause water vapor explosion because there was no water in the bottom of the pressure vessel.
3/14 16:00Vent the start of the containment (second time).
3/14 16:34Seawater injection started into the reactor from the digestive system line.
3/14 18:06To open the safety valve relief.
3/14 20:19Drop debris is diffused into the bottom of the storage container. Small hole is opened. 
Stop after stop after 6.9hr the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system.
3/14 21:00Vent the start of the containment (third time). Effect unknown.
3/15 00:02Vent the start of the containment (4th). Effect unknown.
3/15 06:10Noise generated pressure suppression chamber (suppression pool) near.
3/15 08:20Reaching to a thin layer of sandstone 15m under small debris penetrate the mudstone of foundation ground and reinforced concrete shield. 
And contaminate ground water. 
Able to open the safety valve relief reactor, due to the injected seawater, 
Thinking steam generated in containment, fall, as was cooled efficiently debris flows. 
Debris does not reach the cavity of underground 200m.
3/15 08:25White smoke confirmation from the fifth floor near the building. reference video of 3/27 )
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on-site monitoring data _3/14-3/15
There is no change in the time near perforated to 3/14 17:01 Unit 2 pressure vessel. Small changes can not be detected westerly winds continue to blow.
It has skyrocketed to 3/14 20:30 905.1μSv/hr from 3/14 20:00 44μSv / h.
change is large even taking into account that the wind direction has changed in the north-northeast from the west.
Coincides with the time when the small hole is opened debris is diffuse and drop to the bottom of the containment vessel.
Melt through a schematic diagram of the Unit 2
Gennpatusikichinai_houshasennryou_0Photo
  About the explosion of Unit 4 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
I think debris by meltdown of Unit 3 and fell into underground cavities Unit 1 opened. 
I guess a large amount of methane gas is released from the sandstone by this debris, and caused the explosion of Unit 3. 
If methane gas Unit 4 enters the storage container from the inspection lid of inspection cleaning work for Unit 4 pressure control chamber pool from Units 3 and 4 underground passageway, 
I will be considered to be flowing in the operation floor. 
The case of methane gas, 5.3-14% (hydrogen 4-75%), 0.555 (0.0695 hydrogen) is a specific gravity for the air explosion limit. 
Because heavier than hydrogen, a description of the explosion of the lower floor is attached.
It was issued by the TEPCO, 
Check the partial damage of wall 3/15/2011 06:14 sound and 
Pattern on 3/15/2011 06:56 building is deformed 
Fire check from 15 Mar 2011 09:38 building third floor northwest near 
According to the satellite photo that broke out on the third floor from the building near the northwest again 15 Mar 2011 05:45, that there was an explosion addition to the above have been reported. 
Does not match the status of the building damage. Was strange. 
Status of the operating floor, methane gas convincing if the explosion in the containment vessel in particular. 
The case of nuclear power building Unit 4, all four floor, south side, 4th floor north side, roof, floor 5, accident after another third floor east side, and the fourth floor east side is like lasted, 
It is not it best be considered the possibility of explosion due to methane gas, which is supplied intermittently from underground.
I read from the image the position of Unit 4 plan view spent fuel pool, dryer separator pool, containment vessel lid, refueling machine, shield plug, stud bolt tensioner. Where Do I Get drawing for 1F4 Unit fuel pool leakage . Where to get the status of periodic inspection during questions to level 7fromContainment lid can be seen in the corner of the photo from the sky northwest of Unit 4. White smoke is rising from the spent fuel pool.
401403_3
Yellow containment lid can be seen in the bottom of the truss of the April 15 shooting roof _2011 years Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 reactor building top.Unit 4 satellite photo of the U.S. satellite imagery leading digital glove companies have taken
Damage to the roof is in progress to 3/16 9:35 to 3/17 between 10:55.
_201115Photo_13
For temperature measurements of Unit 4 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant _ Ministry of Defense _20110320
The 20th month of measurement _3 Technical Research and Development Institute
For temperature measurements of Unit 4 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant _ Ministry of Defense _20110323
Towards the measurement of water _3 May 23, reactor pressure vessel of Technical Research and Development Institute's higher temperature than the spent fuel pool,
After methane gas exploded in the containment vessel, water is boiled, it makes sense.
4__201103204__20110323
Taken from the March 15 shooting north _2011 year Unit 4 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The hole of 8m square on the fourth floor.Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 reactor building operating floor 2
Lid of yellow containment can be seen. There in front or stud bolt tensioner
_201115_2Photo_2
There is no wall of all the 4th floor west side damage situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 West. Pillar only remaining.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 west
Clear image
Photo1_4__24_march_2011
The hole of 8m square in the same position as the fourth floor damage situation north of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 south.Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 south
Three pillars are completely exhausted. It was taken from the base with a hit of the shield plug.
White smoke is rising from the reactor.
Photo_3Img_6951
Refueling machine, overhead crane can be seen intact in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 back south. The explosion is to prove that they occurred in containment.White smoke is climbing from the bottom of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 spent fuel pool top refueling machine.
02Photo_5
Concrete pump car of Japan's largest sampling situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 spent fuel pool water.
Installation work of the support structure of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 reactor building _ the spent fuel pool bottom
Seems there is no damage to the concrete building frame of the spent fuel pool. Water will leak from where? Pool gate is doubtful, but maybe not intense water leakage.
Photo_6__4
Reinforcement work of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool
Reinforcing wall of the spent fuel pool under the second floor (left) there are no almost. Damage to the outer wall of the inner (right) is also intense. I did not know than seen from the outside. I expected the outer wall of the outside and break away in a huge aftershocks are expected except for the concrete shielding wall of the reactor around Unit 4 do in a situation like this. Reinforcement work of TEPCO also seems to consider it.
_
Photo_4_
Damage situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 reactor building east side
Wall of all five floor is damaged from the first floor.It is not even funny building tilted.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 reactor building
First floor, second floor does not appear to well filled with rubble.
_Photo_7
Large debris at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Unit 4 sea side wall is falling on top of the large pipe.2 Aerial Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 _ sky
Pillars remain. Shockproof zero. It will not stand up to the huge aftershocks expected next.
This is the situation you have with one piece of skin of the neck. Please be Hakobidashi fuel rods soon.Two walls on the remaining. Explosion is evidence that what is happening in the bottom.
Photo_8__2
Damage of damage 3,4 floor of 3,4 floor of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 east side can not be explained by hydrogen explosion.Debris thought of as on the third floor of Unit 4.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 east
It is a clear image.
4_2404
Detailed view of a boiling water reactorReactor building ceiling crane _ reference photograph
Photo_11__3
The overflow _ reference pictures in the reactor building operating floorMachine _ a reference photograph of stud tensioner in order to the installation and removal of the bolts and nuts of the lid of the pressure vessel
Photo_9Photo_10

Post a Comment